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1. Introduction
Naturalist moral realism (NMR) says that some moral claims are true, true moral claims are 
made so by objective, stance-independent moral facts, and these moral facts fall into the class
of natural facts. A moral realist must offer a metasemantics for moral language: a theory that 
predicts to what properties moral terms will refer in various possible scenarios. Many 
versions of NMR deploy a causal theory of reference to explain how moral terms like ‘good’ 
and ‘right’ get to refer to certain natural properties. The essence of the Moral Twin Earth 
(MTE) objection to NMR is that although causal theories of reference are plausible for at 
least proper names and natural kind terms, they’re not a plausible metasemantics for moral 
terms (Horgan and Timmons 1991, 1992a-b).1 Many philosophers think that the MTE 
objection makes any version of NMR which it touches hopeless. Two standard moves on 
behalf of NMR are to (a) defuse the intuitions that drive the MTE objection or (b) develop a 
semantics and/or pragmatics of moral language which aims to avoid the problem the MTE 
objection raises against NMR.2 In this paper I’ll first outline the MTE objection and then 
present a simple reply: the causal theory of reference for moral terms due to Boyd (1988), a 
central original target of the MTE objection, is in fact not vulnerable to the MTE objection. 
* This is a pre-print version of a paper forthcoming in Thought. Thanks to three anonymous reviewers for 
helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1 Horgan and Timmons (2009) extend the MTE objection to an alternative metasemantics for NMR, moral 
functionalism (e.g. Jackson 1998). I won’t take a view on whether anything in this paper helps NMR avoid 
the MTE objection when combined with metasemantic views other than the causal theory. 
2 The literature is vast. For (a), see e.g. Laurence et al. (1999), Merli (2002), and Dowell (2016); for (b), see 
e.g. Sayre-McCord (1997), Copp (2000), Brink (2001), and van Roojen (2006). McPherson (2013) provides
a useful overview. 
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2. The Moral Twin Earth Objection
According to a causal theory of reference for a given term, the term has its reference determined 
by what its use is causally linked to in the appropriate way. (This way doesn't require speakers 
to associate any identifying description with the term). When appropriate causal links are in 
place, our uses of the term are “causally regulated” by the property that’s the referent. Putnam 
(1975) asks us to imagine a Twin Earth that’s identical to Earth except that the stuff in their 
lakes, taps, and bodies isn’t H2O but a chemical, XYZ, whose surface qualities are very 
similar to H2O but whose micro-structure is radically different. Putnam argues that although 
we and our twins have nearly identical dispositions to apply our respective English and 
Twinglish words ‘water’ to clear potable liquids in our environments, the strong intuition is 
that these uses of ‘water’ refer to different properties: H2O in our case, XYZ in theirs. This is 
well explained if the reference of ‘water’, as used by a linguistic community, is determined 
by what substance causally regulates their use of the term. Since that substance is H2O in our 
case but XYZ on Twin Earth, 'water' refers to different substances on Earth and Twin Earth.3 
Horgan and Timmons argue that a Moral Twin Earth thought experiment which 
closely parallels Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment speaks against the view that the 
reference of moral terms is similarly determined by what their use is appropriately causally 
linked to.4 The denizens of Moral Twin Earth have a vocabulary that works very much like 
moral vocabulary on Earth: those who speak Twin English use the terms ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’, 
and ‘wrong’  to evaluate actions, persons, institutions, and so on. Twin Earthlings’ use of these 
terms also bears the marks that are often invoked to characterize moral vocabulary and practice: 
our twins use them to reason about considerations bearing on well-being, are normally disposed 
3 A bit more precisely, 'water' (as used by us) refers to whatever has an internal structure identical to that of the 
liquid samples initially dubbed 'water' – namely, anything that’s H2O – provided that communicative exchanges 
by which the speakers at a dubbing lend reference to others generate appropriate causal links between the initial 
H2O samples and our use of 'water'. 
4 Horgan and Timmons single out Boyd’s theory in particular in their (1991: 453) and (1992a: 158).
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to act in ways corresponding to judgments about what’s ‘good’ and ‘right’, normally regard 
what’s ‘good’ and ‘right’ as particularly important in deciding what to do, and so on (Horgan and
Timmons 1991: 459). Given that these terms play the same practical role as the orthographically 
identical English terms play in the moral practices of Earthlings who speak English, Earthling 
visitors to Moral Twin Earth should be strongly inclined to treat them as moral terms. However, 
such visitors would also notice significant differences regarding what sentences involving terms 
like ‘good’ are affirmed by Twin Earthlings. Earthlings are (let’s imagine) disposed to apply 
‘good’ to options which maximize overall happiness, disregard options which clearly bring 
about less overall happiness than some alternative, and resent other agents for taking options that
fail to maximize overall happiness. By contrast, Twin Earthlings are disposed to apply ‘good’ to 
options they can will as a universal law, but disregard options they cannot will as a universal law
and resent others for taking such acts. 
The MTE objection supposes that given these differences, the two communities’ uses of 
‘good’ are causally regulated by different properties: a consequentialist property like maximizing
net happiness for the consequentialist community C on Earth, a deontological property like 
passing the categorical imperative test for the deontological community D on Moral Twin Earth. 
The causal theory then predicts that ‘good’ has different referents in C and D despite playing the 
same role in regulating deliberation and sentiments. Horgan and Timmons claim that in cases 
like this we have a clear intuition that ‘good’ has the same reference in both communities. If I
claim that a given act (killing an innocent person to save many lives, perhaps) is ‘good’, and 
my twin claims it is ‘not good’, my twin is denying an ascription of the same property that 
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I’m ascribing.5 This difference with the Twin Earth intuition about ‘water’ suggests that moral
terms don’t have the kind of metasemantics that Putnam offers for natural kind terms. 
The general form of the MTE objection is thus as follows. We describe two linguistic 
communities such that the causal theory of reference predicts that a moral term ‘TC’ used by 
linguistic community C (above, ‘good’ on Earth) and a moral term ‘TD’ used by linguistic 
community D (‘good’ on Moral Twin Earth) refer to different properties even when the usage 
of these terms is otherwise as similar as possible. We then elicit a semantic intuition that if 
one person accepts that something is ‘TC’ and another denies that it’s ‘TD’, they aren’t 
referring to different properties.6 Since the causal theory conflicts with the semantic intuition,
we should reject the causal theory, and along with it any form of NMR that relies on it.
3. Why Boyd’s Theory Escapes the MTE Objection
The escape pod for Boyd’s theory of reference is an epistemic condition on reference which 
is typically not adequately registered in discussions of the MTE objection. Here is Boyd:
Roughly, and for nondegenerate cases, a term t refers to a kind (property, relation, etc.) 
k just in case there exist causal mechanisms whose tendency is to bring it about, over 
time, that what is predicated of the term t will be approximately true of k (excuse the 
blurring of the use-mention distinction). (Boyd 1988: 195; cf. Boyd 2003: 515)  
5 The claim that Horgan and Timmons make is that C and D disagree substantively, not merely in the way that
I and my twin disagree if I say of a liquid in a dirty puddle that it’s ‘not water’ and my twin calls a similar 
puddle ‘water’. The status of this intuition has been discussed extensively; see McPherson (2013) for 
references. Also note that it’s controversial that genuine disagreement requires co-reference (Plunkett and 
Sundell 2013). If it doesn’t, the semantic intuition required by the MTE objection is more questionable.
6 The MTE objection denies the possibility that an utterance of ‘x is good’ in C is true iff x has the 
consequentialist property while an utterance of ‘x is good’ in D is true iff x has the deontological property. 
The semantic options this rules out aren’t limited to the Putnam-style conclusion that the meaning of ‘good’ 
may be totally different in C and D. It also cannot be that the utterances in C and D are true relative to 
different perspectives, or that they have different context-sensitive semantic values. 
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When such causal links obtain between our use of ‘good’ and moral goodness, our use is 
regulated by moral goodness in a way that enables our beliefs increasingly to approximate truths
regarding it as a result of subsequent moral and nonmoral reasoning. This tendency may fail to 
be manifested when our beliefs are distorted by biases or other interfering factors. But, 
degenerate cases aside, the causal links that are relevant to the reference of ‘good’ must provide 
sufficient epistemic access to moral goodness to form the basis for the growth of knowledge 
about what is morally good (Boyd 1988: 201). In less jargon-laden terms: roughly, ‘good’ refers 
to moral goodness just in case there are at least some people who, under ordinary circumstances,
are at least pretty good at finding out about moral goodness and reflect this capacity in what they
say using ‘good’. If this kind of epistemic condition isn’t met, our uses of ‘good’ won’t count as 
referring to moral goodness.  
I’ll argue as follows. Communities C and D must either converge in their subsequent 
uses of ‘good’ or not. If they converge, no conflict arises with the semantic intuition Horgan 
and Timmons elicit in MTE scenarios. But if they don’t converge, it’s no longer intuitively 
clear that C and D refer to the same property. To begin, suppose that the consequentialist and 
deontological properties after which C’s and D’s uses of ‘good’ pattern aren’t coextensive. Now 
consider two scenarios:
Convergence: C’s subsequent moral reasoning takes its use of ‘good’ closer to the 
deontological property, or D’s subsequent moral reasoning takes its use closer to the 
consequentialist property, or the subsequent moral reasoning in each converges toward a 
third property, G.
Divergence: The subsequent moral reasoning in C and D doesn’t manifest convergence.
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In the relevant scenarios neither convergence nor divergence occurs through chance or fluke. 
Divergence, for instance, is supposed to occur even in the absence of the sort of distorting 
influences on moral beliefs which may block a tendency to increasingly approximate moral 
truths, such as self-interest and various other biases. Boyd suggests that, given the subsequent 
convergence in moral beliefs, various historical divergences in moral views (regarding the moral
status of slavery, the divine right of kings, and more) are plausibly interpreted as Convergence 
scenarios where the earlier divergences reflect the influence of such distorting factors (Boyd 
1988: 209-14; cf. Railton 1986: 195-200). 
The epistemic condition on reference doesn’t preclude the possibility of even serious 
errors about which properties determine how we in practice classify things under a term.7 What 
Boyd’s restriction to “nondegenerate” cases does require is that the initial background beliefs of 
members of C and D are relevantly approximately true and their methods of reasoning are 
approximately reliable, since otherwise the tendency for their subsequent reasoning increasingly 
to approximate truths is undermined (cf. Boyd 1988: 189-91). So in the relevant Convergence 
scenarios, C and D both increasingly converge toward truths regarding moral goodness. Such a 
tendency leaves room for various sorts of differences. Two communities that have competing 
beliefs or theories about the same property can co-refer using ‘good’. Two communities can also
have disputes over competing methodologies for inquiring into the nature of the same property.8
The MTE objection has little force under Convergence. On Boyd’s theory, if C and D 
increasingly approximate moral truths in non-flukey ways, this is very likely because their uses 
of ‘good’ are causally regulated by the same property and their differences merely reflect some 
competing views about the nature of that property. But then NMR agrees that ‘good’ has the 
7 Boyd claims that Newtonians were talking about mass and energy all along despite being massively wrong 
about the nature of space-time (1988: 210-11). 
8 Even a community that’s going wrong but can come to see the need for reform using their existing methods of 
reasoning might be using ‘good’ in reasoning in a way that forms a basis for the growth of moral knowledge.
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same reference in C and D. Under Divergence, however, each community’s use of ‘good’ can 
increasingly approximate truths about moral goodness only up to a limit. Boyd’s theory allows 
that C and D may refer to different properties if they would continue to differ significantly in 
their applications of ‘good’ even without the influence of distorting factors (cf. Horgan and 
Timmons 1992b: 243). This is supposed to be the wrong result. So the MTE objection seems 
more forceful in Divergence scenarios. 
Moral realism implies that in Divergence at most one of C and D is on the right track to 
truths regarding moral goodness. According to Boyd’s theory, this means that at most one of C 
and D has its use of ‘good’ causally regulated by moral goodness. The problem for the MTE 
objection is that if C and D don’t end up approximating truths regarding moral goodness roughly
equally closely, then the following symmetries between C and D cannot all hold, given the 
epistemic condition on reference: (i) ‘good’ plays the same role in their practices; (ii) their initial
beliefs about what’s ‘good’ approximate truths about moral goodness well enough not to 
compromise the subsequent growth of knowledge regarding moral goodness; and (iii) they’re 
using roughly equally reliable methods of reasoning about what’s morally good equally 
properly.9 (i)-(iii) are core elements of Convergence scenarios. So we should expect at least one 
of them to fail in Divergence scenarios. But a nested trilemma shows that if one but not the other
community’s subsequent reasoning about what’s ‘good’ fails to approximate truths regarding 
moral goodness through the failure of any of (i)-(iii), it isn’t intuitively clear that ‘good’ has the 
same reference in C and D. But the MTE objection requires this to be intuitively clear.
The MTE objection founders if Divergence occurs through failure of (i). The intuition 
that C and D differ in their beliefs about what’s ‘good’ but not in the reference of ‘good’ is 
heavily based on the stipulation that ‘good’ plays the same practical role for each community. 
9 Horgan and Timmons (1992a: 165) stipulate that MTE scenarios involve equally proper and thorough uses 
of the same reliable methods of moral inquiry. The formulation in the text is weaker.
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Nor can Divergence occur through failure of (ii). Putnam’s original Twin Earth scenario 
suggests that if the Twin property were completely unfamiliar to us and satisfied no serious 
competing theory here on Earth about the nature of goodness, the intuition that ‘good’ has the 
same reference in C and D would be undermined.10 But a significant difference between the 
Twin Earth and Moral Twin Earth scenarios is that while Earthlings have no causal contact with 
XYZ and Twin Earthlings have no causal contact with H2O, members of C and D have causal 
contact with both the deontological and the consequentialist property. Many actions done in each
instantiate (or else fail to instantiate) both properties. So we can expect each community’s initial 
‘good’ beliefs to overlap significantly, irrespective of which property causally regulates their 
uses of ‘good’. Scenarios where each community’s initial beliefs provide sufficient epistemic 
access to goodness to form the basis for the subsequent growth of moral knowledge are 
candidates for Convergence. So if Divergence occurs through failure of (ii), one of C and D 
must have more initial ‘good’ beliefs which are false of moral goodness than the other – 
sufficiently many to lack the tendency to approximate truths regarding moral goodness through 
subsequent reasoning about what’s ‘good’. But then it’s no longer intuitively clear that C and D 
refer to the same property. We’re supposed to imagine that: the two communities use equally 
reliable methods of reasoning about what’s ‘good’ from a partially shared stock of 
approximately true beliefs regarding what’s ‘good’; one of them subsequently goes increasingly 
wrong regarding moral goodness in their beliefs (but not through fluke or bias); and yet ‘good’ 
has the same reference in C and D. It’s unclear what we’re asked to imagine. Intuitions about 
such scenarios shouldn’t be trusted. 
Nor can Divergence occur through failure of (iii). Here we’re supposed to imagine that: 
each community’s initial beliefs about what’s ‘good’ approximate moral truths closely enough to
10 No one would say that the Twinglish word ‘water’ refers to XYZ and not H2O if Putnam’s Twin Earth had both 
H2O and XYZ on it and H2O played the roles it does on Earth (Laurence, Margolis, and Dawson 1999: 163). 
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provide a basis for the growth of knowledge regarding moral goodness; one community’s 
subsequent reasoning about what’s ‘good’ involves methods that aren’t reliable with respect to 
moral goodness (but not through bias or fluke); and yet ‘good’ co-refers in C and D. The 
community that fails increasingly to approximate truths regarding moral goodness despite 
having causal contact with whatever property in fact constitutes moral goodness won’t merely 
have an inferior theory of that property; that’s compatible with Convergence. But if we’re to 
imagine that the two communities don’t use even roughly equally reliable methods for reasoning
about moral goodness, it isn’t intuitively clear that their uses of ‘good’ co-refer. It isn’t clear that 
their ‘good’ discourse is aptly interpreted as involving reasoning about matters such as how we 
can effectively care about each others’ well-being or flourishing in a socially rational way, or 
that ‘good’ otherwise plays the same role. They might be using methods that are inappropriate 
for reasoning about what’s morally good. Or they might be using the same method as their twins
(such as reflective equilibrium, perhaps) to inquire reliably into some property other than moral 
goodness (quoodness, perhaps).11 But then approximations to truth in their reasoning would be 
approximations regarding some property other than moral goodness. So again it isn’t intuitively 
clear that ‘good’ has the same reference in both communities, given what Divergence scenarios 
must be like under Boyd’s theory of reference.
4. A Third Option?
One might object that Boyd’s epistemic condition on reference is compatible with a third 
option.12 In MTE scenarios the consequentialist and the deontological property overlap in a wide
range of cases and ‘good’ plays the same role in the practices of C and D. But now suppose that 
some acts which instantiate both the consequentialist and the deontological property aren’t 
11 Thanks to a referee for Thought for the ‘quoodness’ example. 
12 Thanks to a referee for Analysis for this objection. 
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called ‘good’ by either community. C and D might then meet the epistemic condition by each 
coming to apply ‘good’ accurately to these overlapping cases over time. Since they’re improving
in the same ways, their uses will be no less similar than they were at the start. And yet their uses 
of ‘good’ might not converge: outside the extensional overlap, C might apply ‘good’ to C-but-
not-D actions (those that instantiate the consequentialist but not the deontological property) and 
D might apply it to D-but-not-C actions. Boyd’s theory allows that ‘good’ has a different 
reference in the two communities, but intuitively the reference is supposed to be the same.13 So 
the epistemic condition won’t rule out all MTE scenarios that are problematic for NMR.
This scenario isn’t relevantly distinct, however. At least one of these communities will 
fail to approximate certain truths regarding moral goodness, given their different beliefs about 
things that are C-but-not-D and D-but-not-C. For this to be a non-Convergence scenario, 
something must make at least one community’s use of ‘good’ fail to be regulated by moral 
goodness despite both having causal contact with the property that in fact constitutes moral 
goodness and applying ‘good’ in some ways that approximate truths regarding it. But now we 
have a Divergence scenario, and so can re-run the arguments above. 
A natural worry concerns the interpretation of the epistemic condition. Boyd says that for
a community’s use of ‘good’ to refer to moral goodness, they must approximate moral truths in 
such a way that “it is possible to see how continued approximations would be forthcoming as a 
result of subsequent moral and nonmoral reasoning” (Boyd 1988: 201). Reading this as 
requiring continued approximations to a complete set of truths about what things are morally 
good might be objectionably strong, given that continued approximation is compatible with 
having many false beliefs. But the reply at hand doesn’t require a strong reading like this. 
Consider things that are both C and D. Members of D will say that these things wouldn’t be 
13 The case is complex enough that this is in fact not clear. If C’s and D’s moral views developed toward 
incommensurable ways of achieving goods like human flourishing, it might be appropriate to treat ‘good’ as
partially denoting each of the two different versions of the good (Boyd 2003: 511, 547). 
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good if they were C-but-not-D, and vice versa for members of C. Such dependence conditionals 
are first-order moral claims. (Compare: ‘Kicking dogs wouldn’t be bad if it didn’t cause pain 
and suffering’ and ‘Kicking dogs wouldn’t be bad if we approved of it’ are first-order moral 
claims.) So there will be many truths regarding moral goodness which at least one community is
bound to fail to approximate even with respect to things that in fact are C and D, even given a 
promising start in their beliefs about what’s ‘good’. But differences in these kinds of moral 
beliefs are most naturally thought of as reflecting competing theories of the same property. 
5. Conclusion
Standard formulations of the MTE objection against NMR target the causal theory of reference 
for moral terms. I’ve argued that NMR can avoid the MTE objection once we take proper 
account of an epistemic condition which was part of Boyd’s causal metasemantics all along. The
plausibility of an epistemic condition on reference isn’t something I can settle here. But the 
condition doesn’t seem unmotivated. Boyd motivates the condition for at least theoretical terms 
(among which he counts moral terms) by noting that if the relations that are relevant to reference
allow us increasingly to approximate the truth, this helps to explain how our uses of theoretical 
terms, and the associated classificatory practices, contribute to the inductive and explanatory 
success of our theories. It also helps to explain why the fact that two linguistic communities 
apply different definitions or descriptive characterizations in using a term doesn’t by itself show 
that they’re referring to different things (Boyd 1988: 195). A related idea is a fundamental 
connection between reference and epistemic justification: if a body of justified beliefs is about 
something, this guarantees that when the beliefs fail to match their object, the situation is 
somehow unlucky (Dickie 2016). An epistemic condition on reference would follow naturally.
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If my argument is good, the MTE objection marks no advance over older semantic 
arguments against NMR which appeal to the notion of referential stability. Moral terms are 
referentially stable if two terms that play the same conceptual role (such as, perhaps, regulating 
agents’ deliberation and sentiments in a certain way) are thereby guaranteed to have the same 
reference.14 One such older argument is R. M. Hare’s argument against descriptivism based on 
his example of the missionary and the cannibals (Hare 1952: 148). We needn’t invoke Moral 
Twin Earth to ask whether NMR is committed to denying the referential stability of moral terms.
Nor do we need to invoke it to assess whether denying their referential stability would be 
problematic.15 The related question of whether the practical role of moral terms could be 
explained in some other way if NMR had to deny the referential stability of moral terms is also 
of broader significance. If referential stability can be resisted, then so can metaethical theories 
which imply it, such as many forms of expressivism and conceptual role semantics. It would 
thus be valuable to integrate discussions of what sort of metasemantics should go with NMR 
into the broader metaethical context beyond the MTE objection. A more systematic treatment of 
the adequacy conditions for the metasemantics of moral language would be welcome in itself 
and might raise challenges that are less easy for moral realists to escape. 
14 Cf. Williams (2018) on the referential stability of moral concepts (rather than terms). 
15 This issue is discussed at length in Eklund (2017). 
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